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Abstract 
During the 1990s, the economies of Latin America and the 
Caribbean implemented a series of far-reaching structural reforms and 
took a new direction in terms of economic policy. At first, these 
liberalization measures were primarily focused on national financial 
markets and the initial opening-up of trade, but they were soon 
extended to include the swift liberalization of external capital flows, 
and some countries embarked upon intensive privatization 
programmes. 
This set of reforms generated increases in foreign trade 
(particularly exports) and higher foreign direct investment. However, 
the growth path of the region’s countries is a far cry from one of 
intensive, steady expansion –and this document analyses possible 
reasons for this. This paper posits that there is no unequivocally 
positive link between trade openness and economic growth, given the 
importance of the context and how the process of liberalization is 
carried out. The way in which changes are processed within economies 
is crucial if the productive fabric is to be strengthened rather than 
destroyed. The link between increased exports and growth is not 
necessarily positive either, as it depends on the types of exports and 
their potential to generate linkages that boost the rest of the productive 
structure. Similarly, in the case of foreign direct investment, there is no 
unequivocally positive relationship between FDI and growth, as the 
link between the two depends on the type of FDI, its objectives and 
target sectors.  
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This therefore leaves considerable scope for productive policies to promote these linkages 
and ensure that the region’s export position and the foreign investment it receives contribute to the 
buoyancy of national economies. The present document closes with an analysis of precisely those 
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Introduction 
During the 1990s, the economies of Latin America and the 
Caribbean implemented a series of far-reaching structural reforms and 
took a new direction in terms of economic policy. At first, these 
liberalization measures were primarily focused on national financial 
markets and the initial opening-up of trade, but they were soon 
extended to include the swift liberalization of external capital flows, 
and some countries embarked upon intensive privatization 
programmes. 
Perhaps the most prominent component of the reform agenda 
has been the liberalization of the region’s economies. At the beginning 
of the 1980s, the region’s average most-favoured nation tariff was over 
100%, but in the 1990s it was down to 29% and had dropped to less 
than 10% by 2004. In addition to this sharp reduction in the nominal 
tariff, quantitative restrictions practically disappeared and trade 
agreements proliferated, thereby further reducing barriers to the entry 
of foreign merchandise. In the case of Mexico, for instance, although 
the current most-favoured nation tariff is around 16%, around 90% of 
its imports enter under trade agreements that provide for a zero tariff 
rate, which means that the average effective tariff is less than 2%. This 
is the case for most Latin American and Caribbean economies, as is 
reflected by the fact that the region’s average effective tariff is just 5%.   
Trade, direct investment and production policies 
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The trade openness ratio is almost three times higher than it was, rising from 7.8% in 1980-
1983 to 23% in 2003-2005.1 Both the imports and exports of the Latin American and Caribbean 
region have been extremely buoyant. Between 1990 and 2004, the physical volume of the region’s 
exports grew at an annual rate of 8.5%, which was the highest rate to be recorded in the last 60 
years or more. In fact, this rate, which was also far above the world average, was surpassed only by 
Asia. The region’s imports expanded even faster, partly as a result of the sharp decline in tariffs in a 
context of widespread appreciation of the country’s currencies. Rapid and indiscriminate 
liberalization in the absence of mechanisms to assist the productive reengineering process therefore 
resulted in large current account deficits and a growing dependency on external capital.  
The liberalization of domestic financial markets and the increased openness of the capital 
account heightened the region’s sensitivity to the ups and downs of international financial markets. 
During the third phase of globalization, the macroeconomic situation of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries has therefore been closely linked to capital inflows to the region.2   
In the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s, the region’s countries received a massive 
amount of external credit. These resources facilitated rapid growth, but also resulted in hefty 
balance-of-payments current account deficits and unsustainable expenditure patterns and relative 
price structures that culminated in the 1982 debt crisis. Between then and 1991, there was a large-
scale transfer of net resources abroad, causing the region to lose an entire decade in terms of 
economic growth. 
Since 1991, renewed but volatile access to international capital flows has been generating 
short-lived growth cycles interrupted by slowdowns and outright recessions. Following a new wave 
of capital inflows between 1991 and 1994, the economies of some countries contracted dramatically 
between late 1994 and mid-1995. This was followed by another period of abundant external 
financing between 1996 and early 1998. During the next five years, many parts of the world 
suffered crises that turned capital markets into a source of great instability for the region. The 
exception to this general picture was the significant inflow of foreign investment, which grew 
steadily up until the year 2000 and has been gradually decreasing ever since.  
The incentives associated with the reforms (especially stabilization, external openness, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and privatization) have helped to boost exports and FDI, to improve 
infrastructure and to raise productivity in some sectors of the economy. However, the growth path 
of the region’s countries is a far cry from one of intensive, steady expansion; nor has the region 
successfully tackled the increased structural heterogeneity generated by the reforms (ECLAC, 
2004a). Analysing why the region’s economies have been unable to create the conditions for 
sustained growth within open economies is a complex issue that would involve examining the 
reforms themselves, aspects of macroeconomic management, the mobilization and use of resources, 
education and the organization of labour markets, and the development of active public policies and 
institutions, in addition to the inevitable interactions with the international environment. This paper 
will concentrate on a restricted set of factors by limiting the analysis to the impact on growth of 
international trade and direct investment, followed by a discussion of the importance of production 
policies in the growth process.  
                                                     
1  The openness ratio is defined as the ratio of half the sum of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP, all expressed in 1995 
prices. 
2  See Ffrench-Davis (2005b); Ocampo (2004); and ECLAC (2004a). 
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Section I of this paper includes an analysis of the various links between trade and growth. 
Section II presents a discussion of the export dynamics of Latin America, the way in which the 
region has positioned itself within the international economy and the extent to which the region’s 
capacity for growth is limited by that position. Section III analyses the role of FDI in growth and, 
more specifically, its role in Latin America during the last decade. The absence of clear links 
between trade and foreign investment and growth leads us to consider the importance of 
complementing those types of policies with productive development policies to boost growth by 
stimulating more dynamic activities in terms of innovation and the development of 
complementarities (section IV). Section V includes a series of economic policy recommendations, 
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I. Trade and growth 
Many studies have attempted to define the link between trade 
openness and economic growth. Until fairly recently, there were some 
signs of consensus about a positive correlation between the two. This 
turned the spotlight on “outward-looking” growth strategies, which 
formed the basis for many of the recommendations that emerged out of 
the Washington consensus.3 
The current specialized literature tends to express more doubts 
than certainties about the nature of the link between openness and 
economic growth. Critics of the earlier findings include Rodrik and 
Rodríguez (2000),4 who claim that the positive correlation is 
influenced by methodological problems and that the studies’ findings 
are therefore not reliable.5 This is backed up by Winters (2004), whose 
review of the literature concludes that, despite the evidence in favour 
of such a positive link, the methodological problems make it 
impossible to be completely certain.  
The absence of an unequivocal link should not overly concern 
us, since the impact of trade liberalization on growth will mainly 
depend on the context and how the liberalization process is carried out. 
Over  the  years, many  liberalization  processes have  been  carried out 
                                                     
3  Krueger (1995) summarizes the arguments for an open trade strategy from the 1970s and 1980s. Many subsequent studies 
emphasized the importance of openness for economic growth: Sachs and Warner (1995); Frankel and Romer (1999); Alesina et al. 
(2000); and reports of the World Bank (1996); OECD (1998); and IMF (1997). 
4  Other studies that raise doubts about the positive relationship between openness and growth include Rodrik (1999), Harrison and 
Hanson (1999) and Vamvakidis (1998). 
5  According to Rodrik and Rodríguez, there is a problem related to the correct measurement of trade liberalization, and the studies 
have not taken into account the likelihood of a correlation between a country’s liberalization policies and the rest of its policies. Such 
a correlation could be resulting in negative effects on growth being attributed to a country’s protectionist policies, whereas those 
effects may actually be the consequence of a combination of unwise macroeconomic policies. 
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in different ways in various countries and contexts. This means that factors such as the rate of 
liberalization, the order in which trade and financial markets are liberalized, the macroeconomic 
situation, the role of public policy and the management of exchange-rate policy may all be 
determining factors in the impact of openness on growth. 
Although the link between trade liberalization and growth is far from unequivocal, an 
analysis of the export performance of Latin America between 1990 and the present shows a positive 
correlation between a rise in exports and economic growth (as shown in figure 1).6 In a comparative 
analysis of economic trends in Latin America and Asia between 1980 and 2003, Agosin (2005) also 
describes export growth as playing a major role in accounting for the different growth rates of the 
two regions.7 
Figure 1 
GDP GROWTH VS. EXPORT GROWTH 













Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note: Ar: Argentina; Bo; Bolivia; Br: Brazil; Cl: Chile; Co: Colombia; Cr: Costa Rica; Ec: Ecuador; Sv: El 
Salvador; Gt: Guatemala; Ht: Haiti; Hn: Honduras; Mx: Mexico; Ni: Nicaragua; Pa: Panama; Py: Paraguay; 
Pe: Peru; Do: Dominican Republic; Uy: Uruguay; Ve: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
 
The reasons why exports have a positive impact on growth, according to an analysis 
conducted by ECLAC (2004a), are as follows: 
 (i) Generation of the foreign exchange needed to purchase the imports required for 
economic expansion (external constraint); 
 (ii) Reallocation of resources to more productive activities and firms, thereby increasing 
the economy’s average productivity; 
                                                     
6  However, consideration of a longer period shows no positive correlation (Ffrench Davis, 2005b). Latin America’s longest period of 
economic growth (1950-1980) was not accompanied by considerable export buoyancy, while the low growth rates from the 1908s 
onwards coincided with an export boom. 
7  Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) agree. They identify a total of 83 episodes defined as ‘growth accelerations’, which were 
found to coincide with average increases of 10.7% in the export ratio. They therefore conclude that, although this cannot be 
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 (iii) Existence of greater contact with the international economy and exposing export 
activities and suppliers to the demands of competitiveness (positive externalities). This 
impact grows stronger as product differentiation increases and the national capacity to 
absorb the knowledge acquired by export firms expands. 
 (iv) Use of economies of scale and specialization, based on the expansion of target markets 
for products made by local firms. 
The first two factors are present in all types of exports, be they traditional primary products 
or manufactures. The third factor is arguably somewhat irrelevant for traditional agriculture and 
mining, which tend to involve limited technological content and offer little possibility of 
differentiating their products. As discussed below, however, it is possible to generate backward 
linkages in such activities, including the incorporation of knowledge. Nonetheless, these backward 
linkages are unlikely to occur spontaneously. In the case of non-traditional agriculture (fruits and 
vegetables) and aquaculture, there is greater scope for differentiating products and processes 
(including marketing), although not to the same extent as in certain industrial activities. Economies 
of scale and specialization based on the expansion of target markets for local products also seem 
more important for industrial activities. In particular, the generation of static and dynamic 
economies of scale within territorial clusters is becoming increasingly important and will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  
There is some evidence that, in recent years at least, the increases in exports and growth are 
positively correlated. This evidence can be backed up from several standpoints.   
This does not, however, change the fact that the growth of countries in the region remains 
low, especially compared with other experiences of outward-looking growth. These differences may 
simply be due to the fact that exports are not growing enough and/or that they do not generate 
enough linkages with the rest of the production fabric. After all, 62% of the region’s growth 
between 1990 and 2004 was attributable to non-export GDP (Ffrench-Davis, 2005a). 
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II. Export dynamics in Latin 
America and regional patterns 
of participation in the 
international economy 
The region’s economic history over the past 30 years includes a 
strong acceleration in export growth measured at constant prices (see 
figure 2). Thus far in this decade, the average 10-year growth rate for 
exports amounts is 9%, somewhat more than the 7.5% recorded in the 
1980s and 1990s and the 5% in the 1970s.  
Between 1990 and 2000, the physical volume of the region’s 
exports grew at an annual rate of 9.5%,8 which was above the world 
average. The problems that arose in the international economy in 
2001-2002 interrupted this growth trend, but gave way to a recovery in 
2003 that resulted in an expansion of Latin American exports at annual 
rates of over 10% in 2004 and 2005. 
Although the rise in exports is part of a trend that has been 
observed over the last 25 years, exports have recently grown even more 
rapidly in terms of both volume and value. The expansion in exports has 
been led by Mexico and some of the Central American and Caribbean 
countries, including the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Haiti and Honduras. These and other countries in the area have 
continued to step up their maquila-based trade with the United States.  
                                                     
8  Excluding the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the annualized rate of increase is 10.2%. Venezuela was not included in figure 2 
owing to the sharp decline in petroleum exports when the country joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
in the 1970s. 
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Indeed, in 2003, exports from Mexico and the Caribbean Basin represented around 53% of 
the regional total and 3% of the world total, compared with 38% and 1.9%, respectively, at the end 
of the 1980s (see figure 3a). The increase for Mexico and the Caribbean countries is entirely due to 
higher exports of manufactures, while South America has seen the strongest growth in the market 
for natural resources and resource-based products (see figures 3b and 3c). 
 
Figure 2 
















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 2004-2005 (LC/G.2279-P/I), Santiago, Chile, August. United Nations publication, 
Sales No.E.05.II.G-2. 
a Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
 
In South America, on the other hand, all the countries except Chile registered considerably 
lower growth rates for exports. This situation was reversed in 2003, however, and since then the 
South American countries have been leading the region’s export growth. Although these countries’ 
share of world exports has diminished, they have recorded a slight increase in their share of world 
trade in primary commodities and manufactures based on primary goods (see figure 3b). 
In many countries (especially in South America), the growth of external sales in the last two 
years has not been limited to raw materials, but increasingly includes industrial manufactures or 
non-traditional products.9 In addition, this expansion of exports of manufactures is not confined to 
intraregional trade but also includes other markets such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and Asia.  
 
                                                     
9  In the first half of 2005, South America’s industrial exports grew by an annual rate of over 30%, while those from Central America 
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Figure 3 























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Division of International Trade and 
Integration, on the basis of information from the Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
1.  Are export dynamics enough to overcome external 
constraints? 
External constraints have placed a major limitation on the region’s growth rate and, when 
they have been “overcome” by means of excessive external borrowing, the region’s vulnerability 
has increased due to the volatility of capital flows. 
Improved terms of trade (see figure 4) have helped maintain significant trade surpluses in the 
last two years, despite the increase in the volume of imports. Backed by these trade surpluses and 
inflows in the form of transfers from emigrants, the region’s economies have, in a departure from 
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posting of a surplus on its current account in the years leading up to 2005, at a time when it is also 
experiencing economic growth, is an unprecedented event (ECLAC, 2005a).10 11  
Given Latin America’s history, we might well wonder whether the region’s new-found export 
buoyancy will be sufficient to cancel out the external constraints that tend to accompany economic 
growth –a feat achieved by most of the Asian countries that have been growing rapidly during the 
last few decades. There are two main issues involved in this question: the first is linked to future 
developments in the terms of trade, and the second to import dynamics.  
Many recent discussions have centred on the first issue,12 namely, the way in which the 
growing participation of the large Asian economies in world trade has tended to alter the structure 
of global demand, skewing it more towards primary products and commodities, while at the same 
time prompting a considerable expansion in the supply of manufactures. Over the last few years, 
this has resulted in higher relative prices for commodities and lower prices for certain manufactures. 
The lower prices for some manufactures are responsible for almost half of the improvement in the 
region’s terms of trade in recent years. This, however, has a negative effect on several countries that 
find themselves faced with lower prices for their export products. Between 1990 and 2004, for 
instance, the terms of trade improved by 32% for the South American countries and 22% for 
Mexico, but actually fell by 1% for the Central American countries.13 Although the factors are not 
necessarily predictable, the terms of trade can safely be expected –aside from the inevitable ups and 
downs along the way– to be higher than in the last 40 years.14 
 
Figure 4 












Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic 
Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2004-2005 (LC/G.2279-P/I), Santiago, Chile, 
August. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.II.G-2. 
 
                                                     
10  Although a current account surplus may be good news in the short term, it is a long-term weakness in a region that needs external 
saving on account of the traditionally low levels of domestic saving. The long-standing problem has been an excessive dependence 
on foreign capital. 
11  The surplus is basically a result of what is happening in South America, since Mexico and Central America have a deficit of slightly 
more than 1% of GDP. 
12  See, for instance, ECLAC (2005a).  
13  Excluding petroleum, the improvement in the terms of trade was 36% for South America, 2.7% for Mexico and 3% for Central 
America. 
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As far as the second issue –import dynamics– is concerned, the “over-adjustment” seen in the 
early 1990s was followed by a downward trend in the gross elasticity of imports relative to GDP 
growth that lasted until 2002, although the tendency appears to have been reversing in the last few 
years (see figure 5).  
Figure 5 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS INCOME ELASTICITY OF IMPORTS 











Source: Author’s calculations based on data compiled by the Statistics and Economic 
Projections Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). 
 
The increase in gross elasticity during the 1990s seems at least partly attributable to a 
compensatory reaction to previous years of import rationing (reduction of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers) and the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate in a context of abundant external 
capital (see figure 6). In other words, the high level of gross elasticity appears to be the result of the 
dramatic change of relative prices associated with the trade liberalization process and currency 
appreciation. If this were indeed the case, elasticity would be expected to return to its previous 
levels once the liberalization process was completed and the appreciation of the exchange rate had 
been corrected. 
However, preliminary estimates for 2005 suggest a gross import elasticity of around 3.15 This 
could be because investment in earlier years was too low to cover the soaring demand of the last 
two years. If this were the case, it would be a cyclical phenomenon. The other possibility is that 
certain factors have altered the elasticity of imports, making it higher than it was prior to 
liberalization.  
With a view to analysing the matter further, an import function was estimated for 19 Latin 
American countries using random-effects panel estimation methods16 for the entire period and for 
two sub-periods: 1960-1989 and 1990-2003.17 The following table shows the results of the 
regressions performed using annual data for 19 countries and the random-effects panel estimation 
method:18  
                                                     
15  Gross elasticity is expected to be about four in the case of South America. 
16  See Annex A for information on the methodology used to arrive at these estimates. 
17  The year 1990 was taken as the approximate year in which liberalization processes began in Latin America.   
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Figure 6 















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic 
Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2004-2005 (LC/G.2279-P/I), Santiago, Chile, 
August. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.II.G-2. 
 
Table 1 
ESTIMATION OF IMPORT FUNCTION 
(Random-effects panel method: Latin America – 19 countries) 
 1960-1989 1990-2003 Entire period (1960-2003) 











































Observations 523 247 789 
R2 0.9843 0.9912 0.9875 
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This indicates that import performance has changed dramatically since liberalization. Short-
term elasticity relative to GDP went from 1.35 in the first sub-period to 3.6 in the second. Long-
term elasticity was 1.32 in the first sub-period and 2.25 in the second. Long-term elasticity for the 
entire period was 1.5. 
Another option for analysing elasticity over time is to carry out estimates involving moving 
windows. The same import function was estimated, but this time using moving sample periods of 20 
years and then of 10 years in length. In figure 7, these estimates were used to calculate how 
elasticity evolves in the long term. Using 20-year windows, the calculations show that elasticity 
began to increase in the early 1970s, while calculations based on 10-year windows show an increase 
from the early 1980s. In both cases, this is consistent with an increase in import elasticity as the 
years from the 1990s are added to the window.19 
Figure 7 
LATIN AMERICA: LONG-TERM INCOME ELASTICITY OF IMPORTS 
(Estimates of moving windows, random effects) 



























Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
This change in elasticity could be due to greater dependence on imported capital goods 
following liberalization in the 1990s and the consequent disappearance of a portion of the region’s 
                                                     
19  Although this methodology is not based on a statistical contrast of coefficient equality, the differences after 1990 suggest that long-
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industrial apparatus (particularly in the capital goods industry), together with the increased share of 
total supply that is made up of imports of sophisticated consumer goods. We are assuming here that 
both types of goods have elasticity greater than 1 relative to GDP growth.20  
This high elasticity raises a question as to how much export volumes have to grow in order to 
avoid excessive dependence on external saving in a growth context. Although further research is 
clearly needed, it should be pointed out that high import elasticity in a context of considerable 
growth might exert some pressure on external financing. Although this does not appear to be a 
problem in the short and medium terms –at least so long as the terms of trade remain favourable– it 
is nonetheless important to emphasize the need to ensure high growth rates for exports and domestic 
saving. The latter is particularly important for financing much of the investment required to sustain 
high growth rates.21 
2.  Export patterns and the composition of trade  
Three stylized patterns of export specialization seem to have been emerging in the region. 
These patterns influence both the diversification (by destination and by product) and the growth of 
exports. The first is based on integration into vertical flows of manufactures trade, with the maquila 
industry playing an important role. This is the case of Mexico, nearly all the Central American 
countries and some of the Caribbean countries. These countries’ exports are fairly heavily 
concentrated in terms of target markets, since they go mainly to the North America, but are fairly 
diversified as regards the products that make up the export basket.  
On the other hand, the South American countries have, for the most part, been involved in 
horizontal trade networks consisting largely of resource-based products, although their target 
markets are more diversified. They also have larger intraregional trade flows. A distinction should 
be made between the Andean countries and the MERCOSUR bloc, since the former have a much 
more concentrated export basket in terms of both destinations and products. 
The third trade pattern, which is predominant in some Caribbean countries and Panama, 
corresponds to the exportation of services, mainly those connected with tourism, finance and 
transport. In Cuba, the Dominican Republic and some small island States, tourism-related services 
account for the bulk of service exports.22 In Panama, Canal-related transport services represent more 
than half of such exports; these flows are complemented by trade connected with the Colón Free 
Zone, which contributed 86% of total exports in 2001. With respect to goods exports, the Caribbean 
countries’ concentration indices (by product) are relatively high. 
Generally speaking, over the past 20 years Latin America has significantly increased the 
diversification of its export basket (see figure 8), even as the concentration of its target markets has 
risen slightly, albeit with considerable differences across countries (see figure 9). As shown in 
figure 8, all the countries diversified their products, with the exception of the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, Uruguay and Peru, although diversification was substantially 
greater in Central America and Mexico. Indeed, the improvement made by South America in that 
period was minimal, although the level of export diversification of some of this subregion’s 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay) has traditionally been higher. 
                                                     
20  Lack of data made it impossible to verify whether gross elasticity was above one for sophisticated imported goods. For investment, 
however, a simple regression between the cyclical component of investment and GDP generated a coefficient of 3.28 (while the 
coefficient of a simple regression between the cyclical component of imports and GDP was 4.46). The coefficient of investment  
in relation to GDP was not significant in the random-effects panel estimation but was significant with fixed effects (as shown in 
Annex A). This difference in results may be due to the fact that the data used was from aggregate imports. 
21  Regional investment for 2005 is expected to stand at little more than 21% of GDP, while preliminary estimates from ECLAC show 
that 5% growth requires an investment rate of around 24%. 
22  For Cuba, exports of social services have also been a relevant factor in recent years. 
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Figure 8 
EXPORT CONCENTRATION, BY PRODUCT 











Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Division of International Trade and 




EXPORT CONCENTRATION, BY DESTINATION 










Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Division of International Trade and 
Integration, on the basis of information from the Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
 
The greater diversity of the export basket has helped to reduce the volatility of the terms of 
trade (see figure 10) 23 and to limit the vulnerability of the region’s economies to such crises.  
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Figure 10 
DIVERSIFICATION OF THE EXPORT BASKET AND VOLATILITY OF TERMS OF TRADE 



















Source: Authors’ calculations based on data compiled by the Division of International Trade and 
Integration of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  
 
This diversification is clearly linked to the fact that, since the 1980s, far-reaching changes 
have occurred in the technology intensity of the region’s exports. Figure 11 shows the pattern of 
export specialization in various categories of goods and how it has changed between various sub-
periods between 1980-1984 and the present. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the proportion of commodity exports has declined 
steadily, falling from levels of close to 50% between 1980 and 1984 to less than 30% between 2000 
and 2004, while the share of manufactures exports, including maquila output, has risen from 
approximately 50% to 70% over the same period. South America continues to be heavily dependent 
on primary commodities. Although its share of intermediate- and high-technology manufactures has 
increased, it still falls far short of the increases observed in Central America and Mexico, and 
reached significant levels only during the 1980s and early 1990s. Much of this change is accounted 
for by increased intraregional trade in MERCOSUR and the Andean Community.  
Central America and Mexico have made much more progress in reducing their dependence 
on commodities. In Mexico, primary products and manufactures based on natural resources 
represented 60% of exports in 1980-1984, but now account for less than 20% of the total, while 
intermediate- and high-technology manufactures represent over 65% of total exports. In Central 
America, the change has been equally significant although somewhat slower. A similar, albeit much 
more limited, process has been observed in the Caribbean countries. In all three cases, these 
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Figure 11 
































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Division of International Trade and 
Integration, on the basis of information from the Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).  
Note: Calculations based on annual averages. 
 
It is interesting to observe how export patterns have changed during the same period 
in four successful, resource-rich countries: Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia24 and Canada 
(see figure 12). Australia and New Zealand display an export specialization pattern based 
on primary commodities and natural-resource-based manufactures that has changed little 
over time.25 Malaysia and Canada exhibit considerable export diversification in terms of 
intermediate- and high-technology products, with Malaysia displaying the most buoyancy 
(especially in high-technology products).26  
                                                     
24  Malaysia has a lower level of development than the other three countries, and “successful” should therefore be understood in terms 
of growth of per capita GDP (annualized rate of 3.8% between 1985 and 2005). 
25 This pattern is similar to the one observed in South America, especially in Chile, which has been the most successful country in the 
region in terms of growth. 
26 In Europe, the Nordic countries (which are also rich in natural resources) also show an export pattern closer to that of Malaysia, i.e. 
more intensive in intermediate- and high-technology products (see figure 13 in the next section). 
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This suggests that, in countries with large endowments of natural resources, export 
specialization does not appear to be a determinant of economic success. What does seem necessary 
is to create linkages on the basis of these activities and to innovate, in the broadest sense of the 
word. This issue will be dealt with in the next section. 
 
Figure 12 























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Division of International Trade and 
Integration, on the basis of information from the Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) 
Note: Calculations based on annual averages. 
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3. Manufactures or commodities: Is that the question? 
It is often claimed that exports based on natural resources have limited potential spillovers for 
the rest of the economy and therefore have less of an impact on growth.  
In section I, we argued that commodity exports may contribute less to growth because they 
generate fewer dynamic linkages, economies of scale and positive externalities for the rest of the 
economy. Several empirical studies have suggested that countries rich in natural resources tend to 
grow more slowly than those with few natural resources. For instance, Sachs and Warner (1995) 
find a negative empirical relationship between economic growth and the ratio of natural-resource 
exports to GDP, although this finding was questioned by several subsequent studies.27 
Beyond possible methodological discussions, there are a number of reasons why natural 
resources may contribute less to economic growth: 
 (a) When there is a sharp difference in productivity levels between the natural-resources 
sector and the rest of the economy, the equilibrium exchange rate may generate hefty 
earnings for producers of natural resources, while at the same time preventing other 
industries from being competitive at the international level (including a large part of 
the manufacturing sector).28 This sort of “Dutch disease”, which reduces the 
importance of the manufacturing sector, can be a real problem if the traits of this sector 
make it crucial to growth (e.g., stronger productivity gains, greater production 
linkages, economies of scale or externalities associated with learning). 
 (b) Another reason may be suggested by Prebisch’s hypothesis about the long-term 
deterioration of the terms of trade for countries that export natural resources. This 
hypothesis was relevant for much of the last century (Ocampo and Parra, 2003) but, as 
stated above, this may be changing now because of the growing importance of China, 
India and other Asian countries in the international economy.  
 (c) Commodity prices are more volatile than the prices of manufactures, which generates 
more volatile growth in the absence of export diversification (Ros, 2004). 
 (d) In many commodity-producing activities (particularly mining), remoteness from 
population centres hampers the formation of backward linkages, both in terms of 
service generation and goods production (ECLAC, 2005c). 
 (e) Exporters of differentiated products must innovate (including in terms of marketing 
channels) to distinguish themselves from the competition in order to maintain their 
profitability. This provides incentives for expenditure on innovation (defined in a 
broad sense to refer to the capacity to adopt, adapt and create), which in turn creates 
positive externalities (Chami Batista, 2004). Differentiated products are usually 
associated with manufactures, but non-traditional agricultural products can be 
differentiated as well.29  
                                                     
27  See, for instance, Manzano and Rigobon (2001); Lederman and Maloney (2003); and the World Bank (2002). In the latter, when the 
study reproduced the estimates of Sachs and Warner and controlled for degree of export concentration, the significance of natural-
resource exports vanished. The study therefore concluded that the Sachs-Warner result operates through the export concentration 
channel. 
28  This issue has been discussed at length in some developing countries rich in natural resources, and has led to the recommendation of 
differential exchange rates. Diamand (1972) contests the suitability of this and other instruments in cases of imbalanced production 
structures in which a highly competitive primary sector exists alongside a less competitive manufacturing sector. A uniform 
exchange rate and tariff system would dispense with this duality, but this could only be achieved by reallocating factors from the 
manufacturing industry to the primary sector, which would result in a decline in the former (Mallon and Sourrouille, 1973).  
29  Indeed, some manufactures have limited differentiation, such as industrial commodities (steel, aluminium, or certain textile products). 
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These factors can be viewed in conjunction with the fact that high-technology manufactures 
whose production requires skilled workers are the category of goods whose share of world trade has 
expanded the most over the last 25 years (UNCTAD, 2002a and Lall et al., 2004). This means that, 
quite apart from the above-mentioned factors, it is difficult to imagine an across-the-board growth 
strategy for developing countries based on specialization in primary commodities.  
Two points should be made in this regard. First, the buoyancy of the most technologically 
intensive products is exaggerated by the growing importance of international production networks 
that increase trade without adding value (UNCTAD, 2002a). This means that the volume of 
international trade (in the last two years at least) is not a good indicator of the buoyancy of demand. 
This does not, however, invalidate the fact that demand for such high-technology products is indeed 
more buoyant than the demand for products made from natural resources or for low-technology 
goods. Second, the differing access that primary (and particularly agricultural) products have to 
developed-country markets also partly explains this set of dynamics. The relevance of this factor to 
development strategies is uncertain, since it is not clear how long it will take for international 
negotiations to bring about a change in this respect; the progress made to date leaves little room for 
optimism, however.  
According to a recent study by Ocampo and Parra (2005), there is a positive correlation in 
developing countries between the growth rate of per capita GDP and the increase in the proportion 
of intermediate- and high-technology goods within total exports. The relationship between the two 
variables appears less clear when the exercise is applied to the countries of Latin America, however. 
As shown in table 2, out of the four countries in the region that posted annualized per capita growth 
rates of more than 1.5% in 1985-2002, only one displayed growth of at least 10 points in the share 
of intermediate- and high-technology products within total exports.30 And out of the four countries 
that displayed growth of at least 10 points for the share of intermediate- and high-technology 
products within total exports, again, only one posted per capita growth of more than 1.5%.31  
This is not to deny the importance of specializing in intermediate- and high-technology goods 
for the purposes of growth. Factors that may justify a preference for specializing in higher-
technology goods include the creation of greater economies of scale, linkages, externalities and 
demand for skilled labour. What is more, the fact that most countries in the region have not 
achieved stronger growth could be attributed to their lack of specialization in high technology. It 
should, however, be borne in mind that increasing the proportion of intermediate- and high-
technology goods in exports does not always lead to higher growth, as it does not necessarily 
represent a country’s technological capacity. In today’s globalized world, where production 
processes are becoming increasingly divided among countries (with global production chains 
organized by transnational enterprises), exporting a high-technology product may simply mean that 
the exporting country completed the final link in the production chain. The knowledge involved in 
producing the product is actually spread among several countries participating in the process and is 
not necessarily present in the country that exports the final product. Indeed, much of the technology 
contained in such manufactures is incorporated in the components made in more technologically 
advanced countries, while developing countries are often involved in assembling the products using 
processes that entail very little technological sophistication, relatively unskilled workers and low 
value added (UNCTAD, 2002a; ECLAC, 2004a).  
                                                     
30  Over a similar period, South-East Asian countries increased that share by more than 20 percentage points.  
31  Indeed, Brazil and especially Mexico increased the technological component of their exports, but their per capita GDP grew by less 
than 1%. 
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Table 2 
PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH VS. INCREASE IN THE PROPORTION OF INTERMEDIATE 
AND HIGH-TECHNOLOGY GOODS WITHIN TOTAL EXPORTS  
(1985-2002) 
  Growth of proportion of intermediate- and high- 
technology goods in total exports 






























Mexico, Colombia, Brazil 
Uruguay, Argentina, Guatemala, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Paraguay, Peru, Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, 
Nicaragua, Haiti 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 
and Tradecan, 2005. 
 
 
A closer look at Mexico’s exports as compared with the export structures of certain 
developed countries shows that, although its structure is similar to that of the United States and 
Finland and its exports’ technological content is higher than the exports of Sweden, Australia or 
Canada (see figure 13), almost half of Mexican imports (46% in 2004) come from the maquila 
industry. In Central American countries, maquila exports represent between 40% (Guatemala) and 
77% (Dominican Republic) of total exports. These products generally contain a large proportion of 
imported inputs and low domestic value added. In the case of Mexico’s maquilas, for instance, the 
value added is equivalent to just slightly over 25% of the total value of their exports, and this figure 
has remained virtually constant over time. 
Contending that specialization in the exportation of intermediate- and high-technology goods 
does not automatically increase growth is not tantamount to concluding that diversification towards 
such goods is not advisable for growth. Nonetheless, there are successful countries that have not 
specialized in intermediate- and high-technology exports. A common pattern in these countries is 
for exports to act as an engine of growth by creating domestic linkages and generating new 
associated technologies and processes (such as new agricultural products in New Zealand, mining in 
Australia, salmon in Norway or wood –and design-based forward and backward linkages– in 
Finland and Sweden).  
For Latin America, however, although the region’s exports have increased and diversified 
significantly in recent years (in some cases shifting towards intermediate- and high-technology 
goods and away from commodities), the results have not been satisfactory in terms of growth. 
While acknowledging that the growth rate depends on a combination of factors, above and beyond 
export performance, there is no evidence that exports have the same growth-boosting potential in 
Latin American countries as in economies such as those of South-East Asia or China. As previously 
stated, this deficiency is independent of each country’s position within the international economy or 
patterns of export specialization. 
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Figure 13 


















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Division of International 
Trade and Integration. 
 
 
Even countries whose export position is based on services (some Caribbean countries and 
Panama) have failed to exploit the economy-boosting potential of the services sector. Although the 
extent of this potential naturally depends on the types of services involved,32 it is always possible to 
implement policies specifically aimed at generating multi-directional production linkages within the 
services sector. 
Beyond the generation of production linkages, another difference appears to lie in the greater 
value-added of products exported by successful countries compared with those exported by Latin 
America, and this is reflected in the higher unit value of those goods. This higher level of value-
added includes not only a greater degree of processing of raw materials (which may be imported), 
but also activities that differentiate the product, such as design, marketing strategies, brand 
positioning, packaging etc. This is why even low-technology manufactures and those based on 
natural resources have more value added in these countries. Figure 14 shows the ratio between the 
average unit value of a series of exports in the three “successful”33 countries where this average is 
the highest and the average unit value in the three Latin American countries where it is the highest. 
In most cases, the ratio is above one.34 
                                                     
32  There is obviously less potential to generate linkages from financial services than from software or tourism. In tourism, for instance, 
backward linkages could include food production and textiles (linen) to supply hotels.   
33  Besides Nordic countries, the “successful” countries include Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Italy and the United States. In 
the case of Italy and France, their low-technology exports have high value-added incorporated in the form of design, brand 
positioning, etc. 
34  The result is not the same if the ratio is calculated for the unit value of exports by China and India compared with those of the two 
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Figure 14 
RATIO OF UNIT VALUES OF EXPORTS 
(Three highest in “successful” countries vs. three highest 



























Source: Authors’ calculations based on data compiled by the Division of International Trade and Integration of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
The higher unit value of products exported by “successful” countries is partly a reflection of 
the innovation activities within their production processes. The conventional way of measuring 
innovation effort, based on R&D expenditure, may be too restrictive if it does not include costs 
associated with adopting and adapting new technologies that are particularly relevant for Latin 
America. In the light of the limited information available, that variable has been used to measure the 
degree of countries’ innovation effort, and Latin America is also lagging behind somewhat in these 
areas. Table 3 shows that the sums used for R&D in the region are considerably lower in relative 
terms. In addition, the effectiveness of R&D expenditure, measured as R&D expenditure per patent 
registered, is also substantially lower in the region than in other countries included in the table. It is 
particularly interesting to compare the differences in levels of expenditure and expenditure 
efficiency compared with other countries rich in natural resources.35 
                                                     
35  The number of patents registered at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was used as an indicator of the results 
of innovation activity. However, this indicator only measures innovation in the strict sense, i.e., the discovery of new technologies, 
goods or services. Also, it is not necessarily comparable between countries with different labour stocks and levels of exports to the 
United States. For an analysis of a more precise methodology for measuring R&D expenditure effectiveness, see Bosch, Lederman 
and Maloney (2005). 
 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
             Meat and offal 
 Leather 
  Grape wine (including grape must) 
       Women’s/girls’ outer garments, no knit/crochet 
   Wood manufactures 
   Men’s, boys’ outer garments, no knit/crochet 
   Knit/crochet outer garments/clothes accessories 
         Cotton fabrics 
   Universal plates, sheets (iron/steel) 
Footwear 
    Prepared/tinned fish, shellfish and molluscs 
Textile yarns 
        Knitted/crocheted under garments 
       Paper and cardboard 
              Tinned/prepared fruit 
              Rubber items 
  Wood panel, plywood, improved/regenerated wood 
  Simply worked wood  
            Natural and artificial leather manufactures  
Pneumatic/other tyres, inner tubes, rubber wheel flaps
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Table 3 
EXPENDITURE ON R&D AND PATENTS – SELECTED COUNTRIES 
 Patents granted 
by USPTO 
Patents granted by 
USPTO per million 
people 
Total R&D 
expenditure as % 
GDP 
Business R&D 
expenditure as % 
of total 
expenditure 
Effectiveness of R&D 
expenditure 
(cost of each patent 
in US$ millions) 
Argentina 70 1.8 0.4 29 7.6 
Brazil 180 1.0 1.1 40 25.8 
Chile 15 1.0 0.5 35 36.4 
Colombia 11 0.3 0.2 18 9.7 
Costa Rica 10 2.5 0.2 23 5.2 
Mexico 92 0.9 0.4 31 28.2 
G-7 23 152 153 2.2   
Australia 1 047 53 1.5 48 5.8 
New Zealand 165 41 1.0 37 5.0 
Canada 3 893 123 1.9 55 4.1 
Sweden 1 629 182 4.6 74 7.4 
Norway 279 61 1.6 57 12.2 
Finland 944 181 3.4 70 6.0 
Malaysia 63 3 0.5  10.6 
China 424 0.3 1.1 62 43.9 
Korea 4 132 86 3.0 76 3,9 
Source: World Bank, Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM); United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO); 
and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report, 2005, New York, 2005. 
Note: Data from 2003 or most recent figures available. 
 
The difficulty that Latin American countries have had in adding value, and especially 
knowledge, to exports is what has limited their growth-boosting potential. In other words, although 
it is possible to add value on the basis of natural resources, it is not usually a spontaneous process 
but one that requires coordinated action between the public and private sectors. In this sense, the 
region’s export base, which has been growing stronger and has been extremely buoyant in recent 
years, may be a promising platform for launching strategies aimed at increasing the domestic value-
added of exports, as well as strategies for intensifying and extending learning processes, technical 
progress and innovation, and more generally, for developing systemic competitiveness. 
The experience of the Nordic countries, Canada and Australia shows that, like high-
technology manufacturing sectors, natural-resource-based sectors also can achieve large 
productivity gains and find opportunities for incorporating knowledge, technology transfer and 
the creation of linkages with other production sectors. In turn, the development of such linkages 
and the incorporation of knowledge may give birth to sectors with higher levels of technology, 
which may eventually increase their participation in world trade (Nordic countries and possibly 
Malaysia) or be able to increase the productivity of commodity-producing activities while 
maintaining the same export base (Australia and New Zealand). In any event, it is vital for these 
new sectors to increase the complexity of the production structure and build their domestic 
technological capacity.36 
 
                                                     
36  Agricultural products in general, and particularly those linked to “new agriculture”, might have greater potential than mining 
products in this area.  
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The maquila industry can create jobs and contribute to training by introducing modern 
business management and developing local production capabilities. This, however, requires 
investment in material and human resources, together with public policies to support productive 
development.37 The same is true of services: linkages in various directions can indeed be generated, 
but this will not usually happen spontaneously unless specific policies are implemented. These 
issues will be discussed in section 3. First, however, we will briefly examine the role of foreign 
investment in growth and its relevance for the region. 
 
 
                                                     
37  Another relevant factor is the bargaining power needed to encourage multinationals to add greater domestic value (UNCTAD, 
2002b). However, the bargaining power of China, for instance, in this area clearly differs from that of any country in the region 
(particularly the smaller ones). 
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III. Trade and growth: the role of FDI 
In recent decades, the world economy has witnessed a striking 
increase in the rate and scope of technological change. Scientific and 
technological advances drive the constant appearance of new activities 
and new ways of producing, distributing and consuming goods, 
services and knowledge, as well as the restructuring of existing 
activities. Unfettered access to technology and know-how generated in 
other countries is a key factor for countries behind the technological 
frontier that are striving to capitalize on these changes in order to close 
the productivity gap that separates them from more advanced nations. 
Economies open to international trade and investment can thus 
use the shortcut offered by the possibility of importing technologies 
embedded in machinery, equipment and inputs or intangible assets 
(expertise, licenses, patents, trademarks, technical assistance, network 
access, etc.) to acquire the production technologies, processes, 
organizational structures and management skills they need to narrow 
the productivity and quality gaps between them and more 
technologically advanced countries. However, as we have argued with 
respect to trade openness, the process is not automatic, either in the 
case of links between openness and foreign investment, or between the 
latter and growth. 
Trade, direct investment and production policies 
36 
1.  Openness and FDI 
In the context of closed economies, such as those of Latin America up to the 1980s, one of 
the factors that attracted FDI was the possibility of “tariff jumping” by supplying the market from 
within the host country. This type of horizontal investment is also characteristic of public utilities 
involved in the privatization programmes implemented by the countries of the region. In this case, 
the incentive has been the possibility of “jumping” over the natural barrier that keeps such activities 
outside the sphere of international trade.  
On the other hand, vertical FDI, in which investors are seeking the location where they can 
produce a particular good most competitively, which has lately been fuelled by the practice of 
dividing up the various phases of a production process among different countries, is complementary 
to trade.38 This type of FDI seeks those locations that offer the best conditions in terms of the 
relative supply of factors and natural resources in relation to the good to be produced, geographical 
proximity to the target market, institutional quality, favourable treatment for foreign capital and 
macroeconomic stability (including the real exchange rate) (Bittencourt and Domingo, 2002).39  
While the size of the local market is fundamental in the case of horizontal investment, this 
factor is of less relevance to vertical investment. Thus, economic liberalization tends, relatively 
speaking, to favour small countries.40 These are the countries in which economic openness will lead 
to a larger increase in the potential market. 
Bilateral or regional trade agreements are a special type of openness. Such agreements 
generate vertical investments that reallocate capital within the bloc, together with horizontal 
investments from outside the bloc, since third-party countries pay higher tariffs. In addition, the 
increase in the market’s size constitutes an incentive for investment within it (Levy-Yeyati, Stein 
and Daude, 2002). In this case, the trade diversion generated by the regional agreement diverts 
investment towards the region.41 Obviously, the greater the market size of any of the partners, the 
greater the incentives.42 
Generally speaking, the relationship between trade and FDI is not clear. On the one hand, 
there is an incentive to reallocate capital between countries in order to take advantage of geographic 
proximity or a given supply of production factors, which would point to a positive link between 
trade flows and vertical FDI. On the other, horizontal foreign investment should be negatively 
correlated with foreign trade flows in the case of import-substituting investments and should have 
no correlation in the case of investments are aimed at the production of non-tradables. Thus, 
bilateral or regional trade agreements may attract more foreign investment than unilateral 
liberalization will by diverting investment toward the bloc formed by the parties to the agreement.  
                                                     
38 The reduction in trade and regulatory barriers has been one of the very factors that have facilitated internationally shared production.  
39  Empirical results obtained by Stein and Daude (2001) suggest that lower taxes on foreign companies have a positive effect in terms 
of the location of FDI. These effects, nevertheless, prove less decisive than those associated with the quality of institutions.   
40  This is based on the assumption that all other variables remain constant, which is not necessarily the case, since size can be related to 
other factors that encourage location in a specific place (for example, quality of infrastructure or presence of a skilled workforce).  
41  This could have occurred in some Central American countries following the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). Since exporters in some Central American countries specialized in categories for which NAFTA granted Mexico a special 
tariff advantage, this could have resulted in FDI being diverted away from these countries and into Mexico. This intuitive possibility 
is difficult to prove empirically, one reason being that the NAFTA period coincided with a major devaluation of the Mexican peso, 
which could have been another reason for redirecting FDI towards Mexico (Lederman, Maloney and Servén, 2005). That study found 
little evidence of a shift in FDI away from Latin America and in particular Central America, as a result of NAFTA (in Central 
America, new incentives for foreign investment were introduced as compensatory measures, which could have mitigated the effect). 
Within Central America, however, the countries reacted differently, which would seem to reflect the importance of a country’s 
individual characteristics for attracting FDI.  
42  In a review of empirical studies on the link between regional agreements and FDI, Lim (2001) states that various studies found 
evidence of the reallocation of FDI within the region, as well as increases in FDI from countries outside the agreement.  
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Although distinguishing between horizontal and vertical FDI is no easy task, from the 
standpoint of empirical analysis, the existence of a negative or positive correlation between trade 
and foreign investment should be indicative of the type of investment that predominates in each 
case. In a recent study, Aizenman and Noy (2005) analyse the link between trade and FDI through 
panel regressions for a total of 83 countries between the years 1982 and 1998.43 The divide the 
countries into developed or developing nations to capture the fact that the nature of FDI (horizontal 
or vertical) may be different in the two cases.44 In general, they find that past trade flows have a 
positive impact on current foreign investment in developing countries, while the link is not clear for 
the developed countries.45  
Although an OECD study (2002) finds a positive link between foreign trade (in terms of 
GDP) and FDI in a cross-section of OECD countries, determining the direction of the causal 
relationship between the two variables is no simple matter. There are reasons for thinking that FDI 
should increase the trade of the host country, partly because the entry costs in external markets are 
usually lower, as the entire operation is often the result of a decision to globalize the production 
process of a given product. Aizenman and Noy (2005) find that merchandise trade is very positively 
affected by past FDI flows, both in industrialized and in developing countries. This effect has surely 
tended to increase over time as production processes become globalized. 
2.  Growth and FDI 
FDI may affect growth rates in various ways. First, it is an important source of external 
finance and, in the particular case of Latin America, it has been the most stable source of financing 
since the early 1990s.  
If foreign investment is used to finance greenfield projects, it will generate an increase in 
production and in employment in the host economy. Similarly, FDI geared to external markets 
should have an indirect positive effect by boosting exports. Foreign investment is usually regarded 
as being a supplier of capital,46 technology, know-how and market access, all of which will 
presumably held increase host-country exports (UNCTAD, 2002b).  
Positive effects may also derive from the potential linkages between FDI and local activities. 
In this case, the impact of FDI may spread from the microeconomic sphere to the macroeconomy 
through the spillovers generated by the operations of transnational corporations which demand 
higher standards than the market average.47 48 
                                                     
43  Estimated regressions of net and gross FDI flows (inflows and outflows) against the average trade openness ratio (exports plus 
imports over GDP) for the four preceding periods. They also include explanatory control variables, such as per capita GDP, interest 
rate spread with respect to the international rate, a dummy variable for the 1990s and political and institutional variables (corruption 
and “democracy” indices). 
44  The countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1990 are classified as 
developed countries while all others are considered to be developing countries. Islands are excluded since, in many cases, they 
operate as off-shore banking centres and, as such, their capital flows are governed by other factors. 
45  Although the coefficient is positive, it only proves significant in some cases. 
46  FDI is thought to play a key role in increasing exports in countries that lack the finances to exploit a resource, as in the case of 
foreign investment in mining activities (OECD, 2002).  
47  So far, the empirical analysis of microeconomic effects has not yielded conclusive results. While several studies have supported the 
existence of beneficial spillover effects (see, for example, OECD reports (1998; 2002) and the review produced by Lim (2001), 
various studies on firms have not been able to find the relevant spillover effects (see the studies reviewed in Blomström and Kokko 
(2003)). 
48  In the case of Argentina, Chudnovksy, López and Rossi (2004) generally found that domestic firms with high absorption capabilities 
reaped positive spillovers from TNC presence while those with low absorption capabilities were more likely to receive negative 
spillovers. They measured absorptive capacity on the basis of a summary indicator encompassing quantitative elements such as 
proportion of total workers involved in R&D and qualitative elements like the importance assigned to product innovation in the 
firm’s corporate strategy, for instance. 
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In this case, the effects on the economy’s growth rate will depend on the capacity to generate 
multidirectional linkages between the activities receiving the FDI and other local activities.49 This 
will depend on the type of FDI involved and on the sectors concerned50 and, hence, on what 
interests have attracted the FDI in question (i.e., whether it is seeking natural resources, local 
(national or regional) markets, efficient access to third markets and/or technological assets) 
(ECLAC, 2004b). Ideally, production linkages will generate benefits in terms of technology 
transfer, human resource training and the development of local businesses, among others. In order 
for this to occur, however, the firms must not be set up in enclaves. Potentially negative effects 
could include the crowding out of local businesses by transnationals (either financially or in terms 
of access to inputs) (ECLAC, 2004b).  
In this regard, Alfaro (2003) finds evidence that the effect of FDI on GDP growth depends on 
the sector in which it is located. The effect of FDI will tend to be negative in the primary sector, 
positive in the manufacturing sector and ambiguous in the services sector, while total FDI does not 
have a clear impact on growth. These results are not surprising, since the relevant microeconomic 
effects tend to be greater in manufacturing activities. In certain enclave-based primary activities, no 
such effects are generated and, in some cases, the only impact is the depletion of natural resources 
and massive capital outflows in the form of royalties and dividends. However, other primary 
activities usually offer greater potential for stimulating the productive structure. If most FDI in the 
primary sector is channelled into mining activities, this might explain the negative effect of such 
investment on growth in that sector. Clearly, this does not have to be the outcome even for mining 
activities, since specific incentive policies can be devised to generate linkages and technological 
contributions (as appears to be the case in Australia).  
As for the service sector, the impact of FDI clearly depends on the characteristics of the 
target activity and whether the investment involves greenfield projects or the purchase of existing 
assets. For instance, an investment in the electricity sector that replaces local investment will 
certainly have less of a growth effect than a new tourism investment. The same could be said about 
off-shore financial activities compared with buoyant labour-intensive sectors such as software. 
Some research projects based on cross-sectional analyses across countries have found 
evidence of a positive correlation between FDI and growth, although the results are dependent on 
the countries’ achieving a minimum threshold in certain key variables.51 Other studies have found a 
Granger-type causality between FDI and growth.52   
In short, the nature of the link between FDI and growth is unclear, since it depends on the 
type of FDI and on characteristics of a given host country that may make it more or less likely to 
assimilate the potential benefits of FDI. In fact, in the region’s experience, the linkages in the 
primary sector and particularly in mining have been minimal.53 It is also true that, in many cases, 
the dearth of linkages and local research is at least partly due to the limited capacity of local firms 
and the absence of human capital.54 Hence the importance of the productive policies that will be 
discussed in section IV. Under the following heading we will look at the region’s situation in terms 
of the foreign investment flows received in recent years.   
                                                     
49  Linkages may be not only backward (towards the input providers) but also forward (supplying some type of previously non-existent 
input). The productivity of local firms could increase once they have access to new inputs supplied by FDI projects. This would 
constitute one of the positive externalities of FDI for the host economy (Navaretti, Haaland and Venables, 2002). 
50  For a discussion on the relevant literature, see Alfaro (2003). 
51  These include a minimum threshold for: per capita GDP (Blomström et al., 1994) and human capital development (Borenztein et al., 
1998); plus a certain degree of: trade openness (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996) and development of financial markets (Alfaro et al., 
2004). See Hansen and Rand (2004) for a review of this literature. 
52 Hansen and Rand (2004): despite the very mixed results for the different countries, these studies find that, on average, FDI does have 
some positive impact on growth. 
53  In some cases, the spillovers may be negative, as was the case in the purchase of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) (an oil 
company) by Repsol, which resulted in a decision to transfer the YPF research laboratory from Argentina to Spain (Katz, 2005). 
54  Blomström and Kokko (2003) review a series of studies that examine how particular characteristics of firms receiving FDI in the host 
country can be an obstacle to their benefiting from positive spillovers.  
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3.  Situation in the region 
After China, the Latin American and Caribbean region is the one that has received the most 
FDI, measured in terms of GDP, since the mid-1990s. This situation has changed during the current 
decade, however, owing to the increase in FDI in Central and Eastern Europe (see figure 15). 
Meanwhile, the major privatizations in South America made it the main recipient of FDI within 
Latin America (see figure 16). 
 
Figure 15 













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a Three-year moving averages. 
 
In Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, FDI inflows have come mainly from United States 
corporations interested in setting up portions of their international integrated production systems in 
the manufacturing sector (ECLAC 2005d). In Mexico, 49% of FDI inflows over the past 10 years 
have gone to the manufacturing sector (see figure 17).55 
These FDI flows have generally involved the creation of new assets and have succeeded in 
raising the subregion’s level of international competitiveness, as measured by its international 
export share. Indeed, 71% of the investment received by Mexico and the Caribbean Basin from 
1990 to 2003 was in the form of greenfield projects. 
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Figure 16 














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a Three-year moving averages. 
 
Figure 17 















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on information 
from national investment promotion agencies. 
 
In most cases, there has not yet been any impact in terms of national integration, particularly 
from the standpoint of technology transfer and assimilation, production linkages, human resources 
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In South America, most such inflows have consisted of market-seeking FDI from European 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in service sectors, which received 60% of investment from 1996 
to 2003 (see figure 18).56 Natural-resource-seeking FDI is also significant in this subregion and 
accounted for 19% of total FDI during the period under review (ECLAC 2005d). FDI oriented 
towards the manufacturing sector (about 21%) has usually been aimed at taking advantage of the 
benefits of regional integration, particularly in the context of MERCOSUR. Much of the market-
seeking FDI has been in the form of mergers and acquisitions (about 55% of the total) and has been 
driven by the privatization and deregulation processes implemented throughout the 1990s. While, 
thanks to these flows, these economies’ systemic competitiveness has been raised by the 
improvements made in infrastructure and services to support the export drive, their international 
competitiveness remains weak, and numerous regulatory and competition problems have emerged 
(ECLAC, 2005d). 
Figure 18 



















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on 
national investment promotion offices. 
a Includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. 
 
What can be said about the impact of FDI on exports? Although there is insufficient data for 
a detailed assessment, figure 19 shows the sales performance of the largest foreign corporations in 
relation to the region’s total exports.57 As the figure shows, there is clear evidence that these 
companies are playing a leading role in the region’s new-found export buoyancy. This is 
particularly apparent in the manufacturing sector, but also applies to primary goods. Although more 
evidence is needed, it would seem that increased FDI in the region is one of the reasons for its 
stronger export growth. Bearing in mind that the increased role of transnational corporations in 
exports applies not only to Mexico, but also to Argentina, Brazil and Peru,58 it is hard to explain 
                                                     
56  The percentage of investment in services rises to 67% if Argentina is excluded, owing to the sums involved in the sale of YPF to 
Repsol in that country in 1999. 
57 Includes foreign companies’ ranking among the 200 biggest exporters. 
58  In all these cases, the selected transnational corporations’ share of total exports has at least doubled and now represents more than 
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why, in countries where FDI has mostly gone into service sectors, there has been a considerable 
increase in the transnational corporations’ share of total exports. A partial explanation may be found 
in the sharp downturn seen in the growth rates of those countries from 1998 onwards. Given those 
circumstances, it was easier for foreign corporations with idle capacity to turn to external markets to 
take up the slack left by weak domestic demand than it was for local companies.59 The question is 
whether that learning experience has instilled permanent habits, in other words, whether it will 
become a longer-term goal for those companies to export from the countries of the region. More 
research is needed before that question can be answered, although it seems to be true for some 
TNCs based in Brazil and, possibly, for some automotive companies located in Argentina. 
Figure 19 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TNC EXPORTS 























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) based on data from 
América Economía, the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, and the ECLAC Statistical 
Yearbook. 
Note: The data refer to the largest foreign corporations within the group of the 200 biggest exporters. The 
group comprises about 100 corporations for each year. 
Three-year moving averages. 
 
There is one factor common to almost the entire region, although with variations across 
countries: the generation of insufficient linkages. Once such linkages are created, they can then 
spread out from the activity where FDI is sited through the rest of the productive fabric and thus 
maximize its potential for fuelling domestic activity.60 
                                                     
59  In the case of Brazil, the participation of transnationals in the productive structure and exports has traditionally been high. Indeed, a 
wider sample for a longer period that is available only for Brazil shows that the weighting of TNC exports as a proportion of the total 
has remained relatively constant at about 50% over the last 20 years. 
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Just as with the impact of trade on growth, it is clear that general conclusions cannot be 
drawn regarding the effect that FDI has on growth. In any event, it seems clear that –as in the case 
with trade liberalization– the benefits of FDI have been exaggerated. Nonetheless, FDI can be a 
factor in helping to boost exports and raise the region’s low levels of investment (especially FDI 
that involves increases in operating capacity), and it should therefore be welcomed. Judging from 
the experience of recent years, however, it is clear that not all foreign investment produces the same 
benefits. As part of their creation of an FDI-friendly environment, the countries of the region should 
make an effort to attract the kinds of FDI that will have a greater impact in terms of linkages and 
R&D resources. Clearly, however, this strategy will not yield many benefits unless the countries are 
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IV. Productive development policies 
1. Introduction 
In the previous pages we have argued that trade and FDI can 
contribute to growth, but that there is no automatic mechanism 
ensuring a positive relationship between them. Increased relations with 
the outside world through FDI and trade are a means of “learning” 
from organizational best practices and adopting the best technologies. 
However, the various forms that liberalization and foreign investment 
can take, as well as the different circumstances in which FDI and trade 
are conducted, are determining factors in the impact they will 
eventually have on growth. 
It can safely be said that that more and better exports are 
correlated with growth, and there are grounds for supposing that the 
direction of the causal link runs from exports to growth.61 “Better 
exports” means exports that have a greater impact on growth through 
externalities and linkages with local activities. This certainly leaves 
room for trade policy, but, clearly, countries export what they produce, 
and the characteristics of the production structures therefore determine 
whether trade policy will be capable of increasing exports and 
improving their quality. For the reasons explained below, those 
structures depend, in turn, on what we have referred to as productive 
development policies (ECLAC, 2004a).  
 
                                                     
61  Growing economies obviously generate an enabling environment for investment and export growth. 
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In a broad sense, economic policy for growth requires actions on a number of fronts, such as 
the macroeconomy, institutional framework, infrastructure development, and incentives for 
increased saving and investment. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, mechanisms for 
increasing social cohesion are also needed, since it is the most inequitable region in the world. 
Moreover, not only does the unequal distribution of income have implications from an ethical 
viewpoint, but –contrary to what used to be thought– it also has a dampening effect on growth.62  
Many of these issues have been extensively analysed elsewhere from different viewpoints 
(see, for example, ECLAC, 2004a). The focus here is the role of trade policy and particularly of 
production policies. Before examining those subjects, however, we would like to briefly refer to 
some aspects of what we consider to be a form of macroeconomic and financial management that 
can serve the purposes of economic development. 
Good macroeconomic management 
A notable aspect of the recent performance of Latin America is the real instability that has 
accompanied the region’s low growth over the past 25 years (see figure 20). This instability has 
been very costly in economic and social terms (Ffrench-Davis, 2005b; ECLAC, 2000 and 2004a). 
Consequently, in addition to the traditional goal of a macroeconomic environment that reduces 
financial volatility (inflation), there is also the need to reduce the volatility of growth processes by 
applying countercyclical policies. It should also be borne in mind that another lesson of the last few 
decades is that volatility has arisen both out of private-sector imbalances and out of those generated 
in the public sector. 
 
Figure 20 
VOLATILITY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 



















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
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Policies aimed at reducing real volatility must encompass fiscal, monetary and foreign-
exchange policy, as well as financial policy. Fiscal policy should be countercyclical, with planning 
based on structural, rather than current, fiscal balances, and on the creation of stabilization funds to 
counteract the price volatility of natural resource exports.63 
Monetary policy should include countercyclical reserve requirements and flexible exchange 
rates linked to inflation targets. It is important to avoid being overambitious in terms of bringing 
down inflation, at least when the rate is in the single-digit range,64 and to remember that the 
“inflation band” is on hand to be used in case of supply-side shocks. It should also be borne in mind 
that a portion of real volatility is associated with excessive real exchange-rate variations and their 
negative impact on trade65 and particularly investment, especially in tradable goods.66 The difficulty 
of reducing exchange-rate volatility in a region exposed to sharp external shocks is substantial, but 
excessive appreciation would clearly be unhelpful in terms of the countries’ position on world 
markets and particularly export diversification. Economic policymakers, especially central bankers, 
should therefore have a “second objective” of maintaining a competitive exchange rate. The tools 
available for this purpose should range from direct interventions and “deterrent” action by the 
central bank to controls over the short-term entry of capital, when appropriate (Ocampo, 2004 and 
ECLAC, 2004a). In the short term, improved fiscal discipline is required to implement more active 
monetary policies and sustain the real exchange rate.  
Clearly, exchange rates cannot be maintained “at any cost” since, among other reasons, it is 
difficult to define an equilibrium exchange rate. Also, in some circumstances, supporting the 
exchange rate may give rise to inflationary pressures. What we want to emphasize here is that 
excessive variations in the real exchange rate, especially sharp appreciations, make it less likely that 
a country can improve its position in international markets based on export growth, as well as 
heightening real volatility. The real exchange rate must not, therefore, be a residual variable in 
economic policy.  
The region is also now witnessing an appreciation of its currencies that may continue in the 
coming years, and the factors underlying this trend differ from those that were at work during the 
1990s. During the current decade, the forces fuelling this appreciation are and will continue to be 
the improved terms of trade for the southern part of the continent and the oil-exporting countries in 
general, and remittances in Central America and Mexico. These trends are a major challenge for 
economic policy, among other things because higher exchange rates will make it much more 
difficult to achieve greater export diversification. On a more positive note, a larger supply of 
resources is available and, as a result, some can be used to increase productivity in the economy, 
although this is not an automatic process. 
                                                     
63  The design of the structural balance should take account of the need for the public sector to contribute to increasing saving in the 
economy. As for stabilization funds, they are easier to implement when the public sector is the main producer of the natural resource 
to be exported. The region has some experience in that area (Jiménez, 2005). When the private sector is the main exporter, the issue 
is more complex but, without completely eliminating price stimuli, possible measures include taxes and variable reimbursements in 
accordance with international prices, although considerable restrictions are imposed by WTO in this area. 
64  Chile had single-digit inflation (8.2%) in 1995 and the figure did not fall below 3% until as recently as 2002.  
65  This link between volatility in the real exchange rate and trade flows, although it is intuitive, is not clearly backed up by conclusive 
empirical data. McKenzie (1999) reviews a long list of empirical studies and concludes that they have not demonstrated a significant 
relationship between volatility and trade or, in those cases where it proved to be significant, it was not systematically in one direction 
or the other. Wei et al. (2004) conducted a comprehensive study, but nonetheless also failed to find a systematically negative and 
robust relationship. There are, however, studies by IDB (Giordano and Monteagudo, 2002; Estevadeordal, Frantz and Sáez, 2001), 
and by ECLAC (1998) which demonstrate the existence of a negative effect of exchange-rate volatility on exports in the case of 
developing countries. Among other causes, it is reasonable to think that the impact of exchange-rate volatility on trade should be 
greater in developing countries, where there is less potential for hedging on foreign-exchange markets. 
66  Profits in tradable sectors are more sensitive to variations in the real exchange rate, with prices and costs moving in opposite 
directions. Real appreciation means a lower relative price for tradables in relation to non-tradables, and this is generally accompanied 
by rising wages. The opposite occurs with real depreciation. In the non-tradable sector, however, there tends to be a positive 
correlation between changes in prices and costs, making profits more stable in relation to changes in the real exchange rate 
(Hausmann, Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2005). 
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Lastly, financial policy should aim to reduce vulnerability and ensure access to credit at 
reasonable interest rates and repayment periods. This involves improving prudential regulation, 
deepening the financial system, discouraging dollarization, and working to avert currency 
mismatches and excessive mismatches of maturities. 
2.  Improving patterns of international integration 
As we mentioned earlier, when we refer to an improved international market position or 
greater integration into the international market, we are referring to an increase in the quality and 
quantity of exports; in other words, exporting more, diversifying products and destinations, and 
especially strengthening linkages between exports and the domestic production structure as a whole. 
An export strategy’s success depends on access to markets, particularly high-consumption 
ones. In the attempt to avoid protectionist policies, especially those of the developed world, and to 
obtain advantages in relation to other competitors, at least in the short term, there has been an 
unprecedented rise in the conclusion of bilateral and plurilateral trade preference agreements over 
the past 10 years.67 The lack of progress in the multilateral trade round has further encouraged the 
negotiation of such agreements. This strategy may bear fruit in the short term, particularly for those 
countries that are quick off the mark in obtaining trade preferences (although they will gradually 
disappear as the number of such agreements increases). In the long run, however, there appear to be 
two constants: (a) a considerable increase in the administrative costs of trade, which in some cases 
may exceed the reduction in tariffs; and (b) substantial progress in the agenda of the developed 
countries (intellectual property, foreign investment, government purchases and services), without 
any concessions in agricultural areas.  
Improved and more stable market access is only one aspect of improved integration. Finding 
new export markets (new destinations and products) usually entails “prospecting” costs. Once new 
markets have been identified by pioneering exporters, other companies take advantage of that 
information without having incurred the costs or taken the risks (Ramos, 2000). These new 
exporters are a special kind of innovator, but they make no particular profit by entering a new 
market or exporting a new product, since the initial benefit rapidly disappears once others have 
“followed the leader.” Given the existence of non-appropriable benefits (positive externalities), and 
in the absence of State incentives, market prospecting is therefore a suboptimum activity. 
In this context, transitional measures should be introduced to promote exports of non-
traditional items and those destined for new markets, such as a special time-bound drawback 
mechanism for exports of new products or exports destined for new markets.68 Alternatively, market 
prospecting could be fostered by specialized agencies that help to identify and promote new 
markets, provide support for business and investment fairs and travel to support export efforts, 
thereby facilitating involvement in marketing chains or joint ventures with enterprises in the 
destination market. The idea is to reduce the cost of market entry, and subsidies would therefore be 
discontinued once this had been achieved.69 
                                                     
67  Further evidence is the fact that in 1991, 6% of the region’s exports occurred in the framework of preferential agreements; in 2004, 
the figure stood at 61% (ECLAC, 2005b).  
68  Chile applied a similar policy for a certain period, but it had to be abandoned in response to demands made by WTO. 
69  Reducing the cost of entry does not rule out the need for other incentives, such as those aimed at avoiding the anti-export bias of 
tariff structures and facilitating access to financing and export insurance for small- and medium-sized enterprises that are unable to 
access international capital markets.  
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However, as we have said, quantitative and qualitative improvements in the positioning of the 
region’s economies in the global economy require simultaneous and coherent advances within the 
framework of a systemic approach in a number of policy areas that go well beyond trade policy 
alone. To rely solely on trade policies and ignore the development of the rest of the production 
structure may, in the best of cases, lead to export growth, but this will not spur the development of 
the rest of the economy. 
3.  Policies for creating a level playing field 
One of the main causes of the region’s sluggish economic growth is its slow rate of 
productivity growth. From 1950 to 1980, total factor productivity increased at an annual rate of 
about 2%, but between 1991 and 2004 it rose by only 0.2% per year, after falling by 1.4% per year 
in the 1980s (ECLAC, 2004a). The trend in average productivity in each country conceals major 
differences across enterprises, of course. These variations grew considerably in the 1990s, since 
different economic agents were in very unequal positions in terms of dealing with the profound 
changes (especially economic liberalization) taking place at the time, so their success at adapting to 
these circumstances was unequal as well. 
Average labour productivity is a linear combination of the productivity levels of formal and 
informal sectors. In the informal sector, labour yields diminishing returns because inputs of other 
factors of production (physical and human capital) must be regarded as constant owing to the 
constraints that limit informal production units’ access to them. Consequently, a pattern in which 
the percentage of total employment provided by the informal sector is steadily on the rise will lead 
to a monotonic decline in the economy’s average productivity. The formal sector, on the other hand, 
enjoys increasing returns to scale for a number of reasons, including the components of 
technological change embedded in equipment and hardware, improved logistics and organizational 
practices, and the formation of human capital achieved through education, vocational instruction 
and learning-by-doing. Consequently, a sustained upward trend in informality –as has been 
occurring in Latin America– brings down the average productivity of the economy as a whole.70 In 
other words, heterogeneity in the region is not a reflection of the growth process but rather an 
increasing obstacle to expansion, especially because informal workers tend to reproduce their 
behaviour over time, so a growing proportion of the population finds it increasingly difficult to 
enjoy the advantages of economic growth and become part of the production process. In this 
context, strong productivity gains in leading sectors are accompanied by growth in unemployment 
and informality. This leads to a slow rate of increase in total productivity. 
To achieve greater increases in productivity and improvements in equity, public policies must 
therefore focus on reducing structural heterogeneity in our economies. This means designing 
specific policies so that marginalized groups can share in the growth process and so that small and 
medium-sized enterprises can secure access to credit, technology, markets and knowledge and can 
become increasingly integrated into the production structure (ECLAC, 2004a). 
This is why productive development strategies implemented in the region must respond to the 
need for a level playing-field by removing a variety of obstacles that have differing effects on 
businesses possessing clearly differentiated patterns of productivity: large corporations, small and 
medium-sized formal enterprises, and informal microenterprises. 
These policies should be based on three major strategies: inclusion, modernization and 
densification (ECLAC, 2004a). Inclusion is designed to incorporate as many enterprises as possible 
into the formal sector. This is a key strategy in a region where the informal economy represents an 
                                                     
70  Labour informality rose from 30% in 1980 to 47% in 2003 (ECLAC, 2005b). 
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average of 50% of employment.71 Policies for implementing this strategy are broad in terms of 
coverage and include measures to reduce the cost of setting up a formal enterprise and to simplify 
the necessary formalities and procedures. In Latin America, the start-up costs for a formal enterprise 
(in terms of per capita GNI) are eight times more than in the high-income OECD countries, the 
number of formal procedures required is twice as high, and the process takes three times as many 
days.72 These difficulties go above and beyond the formal establishment of small businesses. Once 
they are set up, they will be required to pay taxes and social security contributions and will most 
probably by subjected to inspections to monitor their compliance with the particular regulations 
concerning their field of activity. On the other hand, legal incorporation will bring them few 
benefits (Michelin and Vera, 2005). The policy in this area should therefore aim to reduce the tax 
burden on small enterprises, cut back on administrative requirements, and offer benefits to 
compensate for the costs of formalization (such as readier access to credit on advantageous terms and 
training programmes). 
However, as can be seen from the day-to-day operation of relatively small enterprises, formal 
incorporation does not guarantee access to information, credit, technology, commercial services etc. 
The second level of these policies, therefore, should aim to facilitate access to the services that 
businesses need in order to develop in a globalized world. This type of strategy, designed to 
contribute to the modernization of smaller businesses, entails helping them to overcome the 
potential pitfalls in terms of market failures in their area of business, which, in stylized terms, can 
primarily be attributed to information costs. It should be borne in mind that public initiatives in these 
areas should move away from the idea that they should try to reach every single enterprise and towards 
more organized efforts to reach groups of businesses assembled in associations. This not only simplifies 
and reduces the cost of implementing support, but also produces clear externalities.  
The third suggested area of action, which may be referred to as “densification”, involves 
designing a strategy for public policies aimed at promoting the incorporation of knowledge into the 
national productive fabric and setting up a more organized network of production, technological, 
business and labour relationships. This issue is discussed in more detail below. 
4.  The role of production policies in open economies 
One of the main features of the development process is that the production structure is 
constantly changing as companies appear and others disappear. The ability to generate new and 
dynamic activities is one of the main determinants of growth (Ocampo, 2003 and Rodrik, 2004). 
From this vantage point, economic development may be understood as a process of innovation that 
capitalizes on an elastic supply of factors (i.e., the ability to react to incentives) to produce changes 
in the economic structure. These changes stimulate the generation of supply and demand 
complementarities (linkages) which are disseminated throughout the economic system and mutually 
reinforce each other. 
From a Schumpeterian perspective, innovative activities include both the production of new 
goods or services and the development of new production methods, opening of new markets, access 
to new sources of raw materials and the creation of new types of organizations. In industrialized 
countries, the greatest incentive to innovate is the generation of technology rents, whereas in less 
                                                     
71  Informal enterprises tend to be smaller and have a reduced range of commercial linkages, since they try not to attract the attention of 
the authorities and regulators. This limited scale, in turn, means that they do not benefit from best practices in terms of technology 
and business, given that they face constraints if they decide to grow or to expand their activities (such as the need to regularize their 
past activities and their linkages with suppliers) (Michelin and Vera, 2005). As a result, informality and small size reinforce each 
other in a circle that restricts investment, and therefore lowers the productivity of the labour employed. 
72  According to data from the World Bank “Doing Business” database, the cost of setting up a formal limited company in Latin 
America (19 countries), is 66% of per capita GNI, whereas in the higher-income OECD countries it is only 8%. The number of 
formalities involved is 12, requiring an average of 75 days, compared with six formalities and 25 days in the OECD countries.   
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developed countries innovation is usually limited to the incorporation of branches of production, 
goods or processes that have already reached a certain degree of maturity in more advanced 
economies (Ocampo, 2003). 
Nevertheless, to a large extent, technical knowledge cannot be transferred by the mere 
acquisition of know-how or by purchasing the capital goods in which it is incorporated. It is often a 
question of a tacit knowledge that cannot be codified and cannot be fully communicated. Even a 
mature technology developed in another geographical location can only be mastered if an 
investment is made in knowledge and organization; optimal use of the new equipment and facilities 
requires the acquisition of a basis of both formal and empirical knowledge to enable the adopting 
company to move down its costs curve as it makes gains in learning economies. 
The generation of complementarities is understood as the development of suppliers of goods 
and services and of marketing channels, together with organizations that disseminate information 
and provide coordination services. The complementarities produce supply and demand effects. The 
supply effects operate through positive externalities: economies of scale (reduction in average costs 
owing to the demands made by the new activities on their suppliers), agglomeration economies 
(reduction of transaction costs) and economies of specialization (development of specific inputs). 
Under these conditions, competitiveness involves more than an increase in efficiency at the 
microeconomic level, as it is systemic in nature (Fajnzylber, 1990; ECLAC, 1990). The demand 
effects are related to the quantity and size of the linkages that boost the growth impulses of certain 
activities. 
If the process of structural change is to occur through the expansion of the fastest-growing 
and most productive activities, these production branches must have access to factors of production. 
If those factors are rationed or immobile, structural change cannot take place. The required factor 
elasticity may be obtained from existing unemployed or underemployed resources, through regional 
or international mobility of the factors of production (labour and capital) and through technical 
change which breaks through supply constraints (an increase in the productivity of land or the use 
of capital-intensive technologies in the case of an excess of labour demand). 
The role of production policies is to help create the necessary conditions for carrying out the 
process of innovation, in a broad sense, and to enhance the complementarity of the production 
structure. The underlying idea is that this process is obstructed by market failures that weaken the 
process whereby new activities are created. These market failures may be considered as consisting 
of information and coordination problems (Rodrik, 2004). Given a specified relative price structure, 
the discovery of new activities in developing countries is a complex process, especially if the 
capacity to “innovate” by discovering new activities or processes cannot be appropriated by the 
innovator. This is because, unlike in the developed world, innovation in developing countries is 
often more closely related to the process of adopting and adapting new technologies or marketing 
forms than to the creation of new technologies or processes. Accordingly, in developing countries, 
innovation (broadly defined) is basically related to investment (Ocampo, 2003), but as the 
“discovery” cannot be patented, it is not fully appropriable, and the appearance of new activities or 
processes is therefore less frequent than the socially optimum level (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2002). 
Coordination failures emerge as a result of positive externalities that various economic agents 
generate among themselves through cost reductions associated with a determined infrastructure or 
through the provision of goods and services. In particular, the provision of non-tradable goods 
(including logistics, knowledge and marketing) may play a central role in the development of 
certain activities or regions (Ocampo, 2003).  
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The historical evidence 
The empirical evidence concerning the determinants of growth is not conclusive. This is 
partly due to the difficulties of isolating certain variables’ effects on growth. Such variables include 
technology, investment in physical and human capital, saving and systematic changes in the 
production structure, as these elements are simultaneously both the determinants and the results of 
growth (Easterly, 2001 and Ocampo, 2003). It is even more difficult to isolate the impacts of 
economic policy on growth (Rodrik, 2004). In more general terms, there is no simple rule that can 
be applied to all countries at a given point in time or to any one country over time. Indeed, there 
have been successful experiences based on policies that combine conventional incentives with 
unconventional institutional features (Rodrik, 1999 and 2003). 
In view of these difficulties, it is hard to find economic development success stories in 
countries where productive development policies have not been applied. In any case, the difference 
lies in the importance that these policies have had in terms of the overall development strategy of a 
particular country. In this context, the cases where industrial policy appears to have played a 
decisive role in the development process are those of South-East Asia and, previously, Japan. China 
should now also be added to the list, although the incentives and form of industrialization are quite 
different in this latter case, particularly in relation to the role of foreign investment and the initial 
importance of assembly plants. Despite what is usually claimed, this group also includes (to some 
extent and with significant nuances) Chile, as the State played an important role in the start-up of 
the production of successful export goods such as salmon, fruit and wood (Agosin, 1999). 
It is also true that Latin America’s history reveals many examples of failed production 
policies, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. The problem was not the failures, per se, which are 
inevitable in any productive development strategy, but rather the fact that the underlying strategy 
made it difficult to generate innovation and investment. In particular, the main failure was the 
incapacity to move on from the process of import substitution to a strategy for enhancing global 
integration at a time when the incentives for firms oriented only to the domestic market were being 
reduced. The conclusion is that not just any production policy is useful to the development process 
and that in some cases it can be counterproductive, especially when it generates revenues that do 
not encourage investment. 
It is difficult to determine the impact of production policies at the microeconomic level. In 
Latin America and the Caribbean, in particular, no evaluations have been conducted of the effects 
of specific programmes. Consequently, assessments are ultimately based on the results in terms of 
growth or the relative success of a particular activity in competing on international markets. For 
example, the Brazilian aircraft development programme (Embraer) has been quite successful if it is 
measured in terms of current competitiveness and of the technical externalities it has generated.73 
Nevertheless, an overall appraisal of the programme is still lacking. There are also cases in which 
programmes do not seem to have produced the expected benefits, but in which it is not clear 
whether this is due to the design of the programme, the choice of the activity or sector, or if, simply, 
the negative results are a result of the lack of continuity of the programmes (a recurrent issue in the 
region). Unfortunately, the lack of continuity is not due to a poor assessment but to the absence of a 
development strategy that goes beyond the Administration that happens to be in office. This is 
another element in the region that distinguishes it from the Asian success stories. 
When comparing the experiences of Asia and Latin America, it has been argued that the main 
difference between the two regions’ production policies is that in Asia industrial policy has given 
priority to international market integration, whereas in Latin America there has been more emphasis 
on import substitution. The Asian economies also went through a period of import substitution, 
however, which was encouraged by the high barriers to trade in various sectors. It would therefore 
                                                     
73  Exports in 2004 amounted to US$ 3.35 billion. 
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be more accurate to say that Latin America did not make the transition in time from import 
substitution to international integration and so it stayed with an industrial structure in which the lack 
of international competition delayed technological progress.74 What is more, when these economies 
were opened up to international competition, it was done abruptly and without adequate 
mechanisms for restructuring production. This meant that there was more “destruction” than 
“creation” and so the industrialization process remained incomplete.  
The lack of a suitable strategy for making the transition to a more globally integrated 
economy is not explained by the State’s failure to demand results from the recipients of the 
incentives it provided.75 This is possibly the most significant difference between the experiences of 
Asia and Latin America in the implementation of production policies: in Asia, there were “carrots 
and sticks”, while in Latin America there were no performance criteria and so no penalty for the 
inefficient (Amsden, 1989; Rodrik 2004). While competition on international markets offered a 
measuring rod for the success of incentives, the lack of such competition made it very difficult, and 
sometimes impossible, to evaluate the successes and failures of the strategy in Latin America. 
Differences from past policies 
When we talk about productive development policies, some people tend to think that past 
experiences can be replicated, both in Latin America and in the rest of the world. Quite apart from 
the value judgments which might be made in this respect, there are at least five objective reasons for 
thinking that today’s policies should be different from those of the past: (a) production policies in 
open economies cannot be based on high levels of protection; (b) the growing pressure of social 
demands on public resources leaves less financing available for productive development policies, 
and it is therefore all the more necessary to target these efforts carefully; (c) multilateral agreements 
(WTO), not to mention bilateral agreements, are leaving increasingly less space for these policies; 
(d) the search for social legitimacy and the need to evaluate policies requires greater transparency 
than in the past and thus requires suitable institutions and, in particular, a public sector that can 
work closely with the private sector in designing and evaluating such policies; and lastly (e) 
subsidies must be for limited periods, and the required evaluation should lead to the discontinuation 
of certain programmes: if the policies are to be successful, some of the recipients of incentives must 
be losers. 
The screening process 
The first problem is to decide which sectors or activities to select, and the next one is how to 
convince the private sector that the incentive will be available for the period of time needed to make 
the activity profitable. From this standpoint, the import substitution era gave very clear signals: high 
tariffs were sufficient to ensure adequate revenues, and there was also the guarantee that they would 
not change in the short term. However, these advantages were also at the root of the problem: the 
incentive continued for many years after the establishment of the activity and outlived its efficiency. 
Similarly, the lack of international competition delayed investment and, in particular, the 
incorporation of new technologies. In contrast, the “Asian model” (with continued export 
incentives) was associated with the achievement of certain targets, which essentially required 
economic agents to compete with the rest of the world. 
The constraints associated with operating in more open economies, together with the 
restrictions imposed by multilateral and bilateral agreements, place limits on this security. It 
therefore seems appropriate to focus on those activities that do not require long-lasting subsidies 
and, when necessary, to establish budget items through specific programmes having multi-year 
                                                     
74  See Fajnzylber (1990). 
75  The reasons for this may have to do with a State that is increasingly influenced by the interests of some rent-seeking sectors 
associated with the substitution process. 
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budget coverage. An example of the former would be support for the discovery of new export 
markets, and an example of the latter would be to ensure cofinancing or a tax advantage for a 
research programme for a period of two or three years. Nevertheless, nothing can take the place of a 
political agreement that establishes certain priorities, such as, for example, giving priority to the 
allocation of resources for supporting innovation in universities and in the private sector. 
In relation to the question of different sectors or activities, it has been argued that incentives 
should be offered to activities rather than to sectors (Rodrik, 2004). The distinction is certainly not 
always clear, yet most of the available success stories have been more concerned with incentives for 
sectors than for activities.76 The concept of activities, however, is applied appropriately in three 
areas: innovation, job training and exports. The case of exports is one of the clearest examples, 
because it is a question of offering incentives for diversification of product and markets. As 
mentioned previously, the idea is to place emphasis on assisting the “innovative exporter” to seek 
new markets or to place new products. Thus, commodities are excluded from this scheme almost by 
definition. One advantage of offering incentives for these activities is that the beneficiary is 
someone who can compete on international markets, so that even when “mistakes” are made, there 
are no subsidies for inefficiency. Education should generally be understood as an activity that 
generates improvements in profitability in a number of sectors. Although supply factors should be 
brought into the equation once sufficient progress has been made with vocational training (i.e., in a 
context of scarce resources, a selection should be made of the activities in which the State wishes to 
place more resources), this does not entail the screening of sectors. 
The situation is less clear in the area of R&D. In the developed world, around 70% of R&D 
expenditure is made by the private sector, although in many cases with encouragement from the 
public sector. If public-sector incentives are distributed on the basis of demand criteria only, an 
advantage will be given to activities (innovation) rather than sectors. Although this is the trend in 
developed countries, especially the middle-income ones, it may be appropriate to consider whether 
this makes sense in the developing world, where relative prices do not give the correct signals and it 
is therefore more difficult to discover new activities. In our opinion, expenditure in the developing 
world should have a greater supply component than in the developed world, although certainly less 
than at present, where in some cases around 80% of R&D expenditure is made by universities and 
the public sector.77 This would require, in most cases, selection criteria for the activities in question 
–and in many cases the sectors– which are to be promoted. This does not mean that demand criteria 
cannot be used, once the sectors or activities to be promoted have been defined, however. 
In the area of innovation, most countries in the region need to enhance the coordination 
between universities and research centres and the private sector within the framework of a national 
innovation system. Incentives offered by the system should never take the form of subsidies equal 
to 100% of the investment, and the subsidies should depend on an evaluation of the difference 
between the private and public benefits (Maloney and Perry, 2005). 
In any case, it is clear that the selection of activities or sectors cannot be made by an inspired 
bureaucrat, but must be the result of interaction with the private sector. In particular, it would be 
useful to talk to the private sector in order to find out what kinds of problems it faces in carrying out 
certain activities. This discussion may reveal common patterns (such as a shortage of engineers, 
problems with regional legislation, lack of interaction with universities and uncertainty regarding 
tax refunds), which could then be taken into account in policymaking. In any case, as the distinction 
between “good ideas” and corporate interests is not always clear, the network of connections with 
the private sector must be sufficiently dense. This requires, inter alia, a degree of continuity in terms 
                                                     
76  Salmon, wood and fruit in Chile (Agosin, 1999), aircraft in Brazil and many sectors in Asia, such as the motor vehicle industry in 
Japan and Korea. 
77  For Latin America see ECLAC (2004a), which contains a discussion of this issue and information on the distribution of research and 
development spending between the public and private sectors. 
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of the officials responsible for such contacts. Just as an institutional framework has been created to 
ensure the continuity of central bank presidents, similar principles should be established for those 
responsible for production policies. In addition, in the light of uncertainty as to the appropriateness 
of encouraging a particular sector or activity, incentives should never represent a significant 
proportion of the investments being made by the private sector. 
In principle, a productive development strategy should be based on a combination of 
horizontal and selective policies. Horizontal policies are aimed at improving access to information, 
credit and technology, and thus benefit all enterprises. In general, a change will need to be made in 
the focus of policy implementation in order to move away from “facilitating access” and towards 
“promoting coordination”. The traditional vision of production policies placed the emphasis almost 
exclusively on the supply of instruments and attempted to correct market failures. This strategy 
generally resulted in isolated efforts with little impact in terms of the productive fabric. Overcoming 
these shortcomings requires placing the emphasis on creating linkages, not only between the supply 
and demand for support mechanisms, but also between the parts of the public sector that represent 
supply and the beneficiary companies that comprise the demand. Experience has demonstrated that 
these policies are less costly, require interaction with the private sector and reduce the coordination 
problems referred to previously (ECLAC, 2004a). 
Selective policies, in contrast, are oriented towards particular activities or sectors which are 
considered as being of strategic importance for development. The reasons may include rapid growth 
and export potential; their capacity to adapt, generate and disseminate innovations; or the intensity 
of their linkages with the rest of the production base.78 It is natural to think that, in view of the 
important role that exports entailing a significant degree of local value added play in promoting 
growth, selective policies should be applied to areas where value is added to export activities. One 
advantage of this criterion is that the quality of the product is evaluated directly or indirectly by 
international markets. The other is that, in principle, there should be a fast-growing demand for the 
new product.79 Unlike the situation during the period of import substitution, the linkages should not 
necessarily be “forward”. The potential of “backward” or “sideways” linkages should also be 
considered. One example of this is the development of suppliers associated with a given export 
activity, whether of natural resources or manufactured goods, or research to discover products or 
processes that can be patented. An example of the former is the development of industrial clusters 
and services to support the development of natural resources in various countries in the region 
(Katz, 2005 and ECLAC, 2005c);80 an example of the latter is Norwegian research into salmon or 
Australian mining research. In this area, and taking into account the comparative advantages of the 
region in food production, biotechnology would be an activity to encourage. 
In other words, countries rich in natural resources should not ignore these advantages, but 
should instead use them to generate dynamic comparative advantages by creating new production 
activities related to these sectors. Moreover, the possibility of diversifying into high-technology 
goods and exports (according to the classification in section II) does not appear to be an option open 
to the countries of the region,81 especially taking into account the forces of agglomeration present in 
the United States, Europe and Asia.82 Obviously, this refers to diversification involving something 
more than the mere assembly of sophisticated goods in the absence of the capacity to produce the 
most valuable parts. It should once more be stressed that, for most countries in the region, the road 
to diversification should begin with strategies aimed at adding value and knowledge to natural 
resources. 
                                                     
78  A classic approach to this question can be found in Prebisch (1964).  
79  One example is the natural-resource based clusters in Northern Europe. 
80  Promotion of the development of industrial clusters and services to support the use of natural resources opens up the opportunity for 
joint efforts between municipalities, regional universities, research centres and small family enterprises. 
81  Larger countries are more likely to be able to make progress in this area. 
82  See Ocampo and Parra (2005). 
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Emphasis on these sectors, however, does not rule out the possibility of selectively promoting 
initiatives aimed at creating new sectors that are not necessarily closely associated with the region’s 
comparative advantages, at least from a static point of view, as exemplified by information 
technology in Costa Rica, or aircraft production in Brazil. A recent example would be the 
development of software in countries such as Argentina and Uruguay. This activity began in around 
the year 2000 in both countries and benefited from various incentives, including a reduction of 
labour taxes in Argentina, and exemption from industrial and commercial income tax in the case of 




                                                     
83  Given the difficulty of calculating total software exports, these figures should be understood as minimum values. 
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V. Conclusions and policy 
recommendations 
Throughout this document we have sought to analyse the 
reasons why there is no unequivocally positive link between trade 
openness and economic growth. The way and the context in which 
liberalization is carried out are crucial, as is the way in which changes 
are processed within economies so that the productive fabric is 
strengthened and new dynamic activities discovered. Even in the case 
of exports, whose positive correlation with economic growth appears 
to be more clear-cut, the causal relationship is still not an automatic 
one. Indeed, the impact that exports have on growth will depend on the 
types of goods or services involved and on their potential effectiveness 
in generating positive externalities and dynamic linkages with the rest 
of the production structure. Similarly, in the case of foreign direct 
investment, there is no unequivocally positive relationship between 
FDI and growth, as the link between the two depends on the type of 
FDI, on, in particular, the target sector, and on whether the investment 
involves greenfield projects or the purchase of existing assets.  
Although such links can never be automatic, there is nonetheless 
considerable scope for productive policies to help to generate them 
through specific stimuli.   
Although it is impossible to draw up a single policy agenda for 
the region (as it would depend on the restrictions imposed by the size 
of each country’s markets, its accumulated capacities and institutional 
development), certain general principles can be established: 
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1. The objective must be greater global integration. 
2. In view of the scant resources available, efforts must be targeted, and hence a mix of 
horizontal and selective policies should be implemented. 
3. Selective policies should offer incentives for new activities with potential for 
stimulating the productive structure; in particular, there should be incentives for adding 
value to export activities. 
4. Maintaining a stable and “competitive” exchange rate is a key element for the 
discovery of new goods, processes or markets in activities that produce tradable goods.  
5. Although the public sector should lead the process of devising strategies, specific 
policies should be devised on the basis of significant interaction with the private sector. 
6. Incentives should be limited in time, and performance criteria should act as a 
counterpart. 
7. Innovation in the broad sense should be encouraged, so that information on 
technologies and general training should be equally or in some cases more important 
than investment in research and development. 
8. Human resources training is an indispensable requirement for any development policy 
and, in particular, in a strategy intended to increase the linkages of the export sectors 
and of FDI.  
9. The policy for attracting foreign investment should be based on clear and stable rules 
and not on special incentives, with the exception of those activities that are expected to 
generate positive externalities through innovation and productive linkages. 
10. An institutional framework should be developed for productive policies based on the 
principles of: transparency, evaluation, coordination within the public sector and 
continuity of the officials dedicated to policy-making and coordination with the private 
sector. 
11. The implementation of productive policies depends on the institutional capacity for 
designing and evaluating them, and hence their implementation may vary considerably 
between countries. 
12. Countries should implement horizontal policies conducive to reducing informality. 
13. Policies should be implemented to correct the market failures that affect small and 
medium-sized enterprises, while avoiding widespread bailout operations. These 
policies will be all the more effective if they encourage the establishment of linkages in 
the private sector, through business associations organized by region or activity. 
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Annex A 
Estimation of the income elasticity of imports in Latin America (1960-2003) 
Panel estimation techniques were used to calculate the income elasticity of imports using data 
for 19 Latin American countries84 covering the period 1960-2003. The equation is as follows: 
log(mit)= β0 +β1log(yit)+  β2log(yit-1) + β3log(mit-1) + β4log(tcrit) +  uit 
where mit represents imports in constant dollars of country i at time t; y is GDP, and tcr is 
the real exchange rate. 
Different specifications are estimated by adding dummy variables to control for different 
events:  
(a) The 1982 debt crisis and devaluations. An impulse variable was used for this event.  It 
was attributed a value of 1 for 1982 and of zero for all the other years. 
(b) Economic liberalization. The variable used for this event that was given a value of 1 
from 1990 on and of zero in the other periods. Its purpose is to capture any change in 
the level of imports that may have occurred in conjunction with the economic 
liberalization process, rather than attributing it to a change in elasticity.85 
In order to analyse the possibility of a structural change in income elasticity based on the 
liberalization process, estimates were made for two separate sub-periods, with the cut-off point 
being 1990. In other words, regressions were estimated for 1960-1989, on the one hand, and for 
1990-2003, on the other.  
Table A1 shows the estimates for the complete period using random effects.86  
Table A1 
RANDOM EFFECTS – COMPLETE PERIOD (1960-2003) 





























D90 ------ 0.088 
(0.000) 
Note: p-value in brackets. 
 
Except for the trend in specification (2), all the estimated coefficients showed the expected 
signs and were statistically significant. The estimated coefficient for dummy variable D82 is 
                                                     
84  Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. 
85  1990 was used as the cut-off point because it approximates the year when liberalization measures began to be taken in Latin 
American economies.  
86  An attempt was made to include the investment-to-GDP coefficient in the estimates as an additional explanatory variable, but the 
result did not differ significantly from zero. 
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negative and differs statistically from zero. This provides evidence to support the hypothesis that, as 
a consequence of the debt crisis, the level of imports declined. On the other hand, the coefficient 
associated with D90 is positive and is also statistically significant. The intuitive conclusion 
suggested by this result is that the liberalization processes carried out in the 1990s had an impact on 
the increase in the level of imports. The instantaneous income elasticity of imports is approximately 
1.8 for both specifications. 
Although the Hausman Test indicated that the random effects were the appropriate ones in 
this case, estimates with fixed effects were also prepared. The results of these calculations for the 
complete period are shown in table A2.  
Table A2 
FIXED EFFECTS – COMPLETE PERIOD (1960-2003) 

































D90 ------ 0.118 
(0.000) 
Note: p-value in brackets. 
 
On the basis of the estimated coefficients, the long-term elasticities shown in table A3 were 
calculated.  
Table A3 
LONG TERM – INCOME ELASTICITY OF IMPORTS  
 (1) (2) 
Fixed effects 1.089 1.400 
   
Random effects 1.394 1.474 
 
 
The results for the two separate sub-periods are reported in tables A4 (random effects) and 
A5 (fixed effects). In both cases, the instantaneous income elasticity of imports nearly triples 
between the first and second sub-period.  
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Table A4 
SUB-PERIODS – RANDOM EFFECTS 
































SUB-PERIODS – FIXED EFFECTS 
































Note: p-value in brackets. 
 
The long-term elasticities calculated on the basis of the above coefficients are shown in 
table A6.  
Table A6 
LONG TERM – INCOME ELASTICITY OF IMPORTS 
 1960-1989 1990-2003 
Fixed effects 1.057 0.953 
   
Random effects  1.318 2.252 
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An additional way of gauging whether there was a change in the level of imports between the 
two sub-periods is to compare the means of the countries’ import-to-GDP ratios. This was done 
using Bartlett’s variances test. Depending on what the result was, the appropriate comparison of 
means was conducted, since this depends crucially on the assumption that is made concerning the 
equality of variances. In the event that the null hypothesis of the Bartlett test was not rejected, a t-
test of equality of variances was performed, while in the alternative case, a t-test was used which 
explicitly assumes that the variances between the two sub-periods are different. 
Taking these results into account, the test of means was conducted. In this case, the 
assumption of equal means for the two sub-periods was rejected for all countries. The results 
indicate that for 17 countries, including the three biggest economies in the region, there was a 
statistically significant increase in the imports/GDP quotient. Chile and Panama, however, unlike 
the rest of the countries under consideration, exhibited a significantly higher mean in the first sub-
period than in the second. 
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